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THE HORMONE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE
EEC AND THE UNITED STATES WITHIN
THE CONTEXT OF GATT
Werner P. Meng
For many years, consumer organizations within the European
Community have demanded the prohibition of natural and synthetic
hormones from use in animal fodder. Since the level of hormone use
by breeders varies among Member States, demands for a hormone pro-
hibition have also differed in intensity from State to State. After
lengthy negotiations beset with legal difficulties, a general, commu-
nity-wide prohibition became reality at the beginning of 1989. The
price of this policy has been trade difficulties with the United States
which, up to the present time,' have resulted in trade sanctions and
economic losses on both sides. Since both parties have agreed to re-
solve future economic differences in a more rational manner, General
Agreement of Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") related questions of inter-
national law that surfaced and were championed by both sides must be
examined to clarify the role of the law in such cases. The following
discussion will deal with these relevant issues.
I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE HORMONE BAN
A. Legal Position within the EEC Council of Ministers
In 1980, European consumer organizations called for a boycott on
purchases of hormone-treated veal. This was the direct result of sev-
eral "hormone scandals" which had caused a sensation within the
EEC. The Council of Ministers responded by declaring its support for
banning all hormone substances, natural and synthetic alike, from
animal fodder. EEC veterinary law exists in the form of general direc-
tives harmonizing the laws of Member States. These directives bind
States to goals specified in article 189 of the EEC Treaty ("EECT" or
"Treaty of Rome"), yet leave them a certain freedom to choose their
own form and methods. Thus, the hormone ban was also subject to
the "harmonization by directive" procedure.
In October 1980, the Commission submitted to the Council of
Ministers a draft of general guidelines for a ban. This proposal was
1. This article was finalized October 31, 1989.
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expanded in January 1981, to include limits on the exceptional use of
hormonal substances for therapeutic purposes. In February 1981, dis-
cussion in the European Parliament showed that a clear majority sup-
ported a ban on all hormones, but it also became apparent that Ireland
and the United Kingdom favored the use of hormones as a growth
stimulant for slaughter animals. They enjoyed support from other
third parties, including the United States and the European pharma-
ceutical industry.
In July 1981, the Council adopted a directive prohibiting the use of
thyrostatics and stilbenes, hormonal substances generally presumed to
have harmful effects. 2 However, no agreement could be reached re-
garding a complete prohibition on using two synthetic3 and three nat-
ural 4 hormones for feeding purposes. The directive served only to
demonstrate that further research was required regarding the benign
or harmful nature of those five substances. Article 5 of the directive
specified that the Council should "reach a unanimous decision as soon
as possible" regarding further provisions, but that, in the meantime,
regulations previously promulgated by individual States concerning
those hormones would continue to apply.
Between 1981 and 1984, further scientific studies were undertaken
to determine the harmfulness of additional hormonal substances. In
this process, natural hormones were seen as the least likely to be harm-
ful when administered in proper dosages, while synthetic hormones
required further investigation. The Commission proposed a new di-
rective in June 1984, banning only the use of the two synthetic hor-
mones, barring a later, contrary decision by the Council. The use of
natural hormones would be left to the discretion of individual Member
States. 5 These actions were met with great concern by consumer orga-
nizations.6 Further, the Member States themselves were divided.
While one group of States was prepared to ban the use of hormones
completely in the fattening of slaughter animals, a more generous pol-
2. Council Directive 81/602/EEC concerning the prohibition of certain substances having a
hormonal action and any substances having a thyrostatic action, 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
222) 32 (1981).
3. Trenbolone and Zeranol. Id.
4. Progesterone, Testosterone, and Oestradiol 17/13. Id.
5. Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 81/602/EEC concerning the prohi-
bition of certain substances, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 170) 4 (1984).
6. For the entire history from 1980-85, see EUROPE: DAILY BULLETIN, No. 4197, Nov. 4-5,
1985, at 15. For information on the strong protests in Europe, see EUROPE: DAILY BULLETIN,
No. 4013, Jan. 24, 1985, at 12; EUROPE: DAILY BULLETIN, No. 4014, Jan. 25, 1985, at 13;
EUROPE: DAILY BULLETIN, No. 4024, Feb. 8, 1985, at 13; EUROPE: DAILY BULLETIN, No.
4040, Mar. 2, 1985, at 16; EUROPE: DAILY BULLETIN, No. 4066, Apr. 9-10, 1985, at 12; EU-
ROPE: DAILY BULLETIN, No. 4067, Apr. 11, 1985, at 14; EUROPE: DAILY BULLETIN, No. 4078,
Apr. 15-16, 1985, at 10.
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icy was favored by Ireland, the United Kingdom and France.7
This disagreement led to the issuing of a directive by the Council
on July 16, 1985 that only supplemented the 1981 directive in creating
formal rules of control.8 It contained no substantive rules concerning
the use of the five controversial hormonal substances, showing that
there was still no sign of agreement on this issue. The Council, how-
ever, did set a timetable for itself. Article 14 specifically stated that a
decision regarding these hormones was to be made before the end of
1985. The deadline for state implementation of the 1985 directive was
also to be determined within this period.
In the intervening period prior to the deadline, the European Par-
liament demanded the creation of a directly applicable EEC regulation
establishing uniform standards for the use of hormonal substances in
all Member States.9 In November 1985, the Commission withdrew
the suggested resolution of 1984, which was compromise-oriented, and
renewed its former proposal of 1980, which generally prohibited the
use of all hormonal substances (with the exception of uses for thera-
peutic purposes).10 This, in turn, drew further categorical opposition
from the United Kingdom and Denmark, while France and Ireland
independently registered specified reservations. The U.K. took the
view that no proof existed regarding harmful effects of natural hor-
mones on human health. I This dissent had been anticipated by the
Commission, which had accordingly based the proposal only on article
43 of the EECT - the source of regulating powers for a common
agricultural policy. This legal basis required only a qualified majority
within the Council for adoption. Earlier veterinary directives, includ-
ing those issued concerning the use of hormonal substances, were all
based "especially" on article 43 and article 100 - the general provi-
sion concerning legal standardization. However, article 100 requires a
unanimous vote by the Council. Since such unanimity was not ex-
pected at that time, article 100 was no longer cited as a legal basis.
Following these procedural maneuvers, the general ban on hor-
mones was finally passed in December 1985. The pertinent directive,
7. See EUROPE: DAILY BULLETIN, No. 4107, June 12, 1985, at 13.
8. Council Directive 85/358/EEC supplementing directive 81/602/EEC concerning the pro-
hibition of certain substances, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 191) 46 (1985).
9. Directive on the prohibition of substances having hormonal or thyrostatic action, 27 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. C 288) 153 (1985); EUROPE: DAILY BULLETIN, No. 4182, Oct. 12, 1985, at
13.
10. Amendment of the proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 81/602/EEC
concerning the prohibition of certain substances, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 313) 4 (1985);
EUROPE: DAILY BULLETIN, No. 4195, Oct. 31, 1985, at 13.
11. EUROPE: DAILY BULLETIN, No. 4209, Nov. 22, 1985, at 13.
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based on Art. 43 of the EECT, was adopted by written procedure 12 by
a qualified majority. 13 The United Kingdom and Denmark voted
against the directive; Ireland abstained. The two dissenting States also
opposed the use of the written protocol.
The directive was a comprehensive ban on the use of the five con-
troversial hormonal substances for feeding purposes. Only three natu-
ral hormones were permitted to be used for therapeutic purposes.
Article 5 bound Member States to ensure that no animals treated with
the forbidden hormones would be transported into other Member
States. Article 6 required a prohibition on the importation of such
animals from third-party States.
Compliance with the prohibition concerning third-party States was
ensured via the regulatory scheme common to Community veterinary
law. Meat could only be imported from countries appearing on a spe-
cial list sanctioned by the EEC. 14 In addition, fresh meat from these
States could only originate from processing plants that also appeared
on an approved list.' 5 Plants appeared on the list only when their
home States could guarantee that EEC veterinary standards were be-
ing met. 16
Similar guarantees regarding the banned hormones were also re-
quired from third-party States. Community law expressly provided
that these guarantees must be equivalent to those demanded by Mem-
ber States of their own domestic industries, 17 ensuring equal treatment
of Community and third-party State producers. Article 6 of directive
85/649/EEC of December 31, 1985, provided for lists to be compiled
of countries and slaughtering plants that could guarantee they met
hormone standards. Article 6, section 5 of this directive gave third-
party States until January 1, 1988, to meet these conditions.
By the end of 1985, the Member States still had not reached a
common consensus regarding the harmful effects of hormones on
12. Art. 6, § 1 of the Procedural Rules of the Council provide for a written vote if all mem-
bers agree. Rules of Procedure adopted by the Council, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 268) 1, 2
(1979).
13. Council Directive 85/649/EEC prohibiting the use in livestock farming of certain sub-
stances having a hormonal action, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 382) 228 (1985).
14. Directive du Conseil 72/462/CEE concernant l'importation d'animaux des esp~ces bo-
vine et porcine et des viandes fraiches en provenance des pays tiers, 15 J.O. EUR. COMM. (No. L
302) art. 3, at 28, 30-31 (1972).
15. Id. art. 4, para. I.
16. For the FRG see paragraph 13, section 2 in comparison with paragraph 14 of the meat
hygiene regulation from October 30, 1986. 1986 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] 1 1678 (W. Ger.).
The conditions for recognition will be set according to paragraph 14, section 2 and paragraph I I
section 1 of this regulation with reference to EEC directives existing at the time.
17. Council Directive 85/358/EEC supplementing directive 81/602/EEC concerning the
prohibition of certain substances, 28 O.J. Eua. COMM. (No. L 191) 46 (1985) (art. 3).
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human health. The preamble of the directive of December 31, 1985,
mentioned that the health effects of hormonal substances had received
differing evaluations. This was followed by a statement that competi-
tion had at least been distorted by differing standards - a problem
that would eventually have to be resolved. One would have to make
sure that consumers found conditions of purchase that were "appar-
ently identical, and, at the same time, met most of their needs and
expectations."
B. Legal Dispute before the European Court of Justice
The United Kingdom filed a complaint with the European Court
of Justice ("ECJ") in Luxembourg regarding directive 85/649/EEC.
The U.K. alleged that an improper legal basis had been chosen for the
directive, that its legal reasoning was flawed, that the legal principles
promulgated violated good faith standards, that the European Parlia-
ment and the Economic and Social Council had not been properly in-
cluded in the process and that the voting procedure in the Council of
Ministers had not been conducted according to proper procedure.
The court nullified the directive on the basis of the last charge, due
to the United Kingdom's explicit rejection of the use of the written
voting procedure. 18 It did, however, find article 43 of the EECT to be
a permissible basis for the exercise of legislative power, thus affirming
that a qualified majority would be sufficient for adoption. Neither ear-
lier precedent nor the unanimity foreseen in article 5 of EEC directive
81/602 could alter the requirements of the EECT.
With this ruling, directive 85/649/EEC from December 31, 1985,
was declared null and void. However, the opportunity was left open
for its renewal via a qualified majority and proper procedures. This in
fact occurred on March 7, 1988,19 when the unaltered text of the nulli-
fied directive was again adopted. 20 The specified time for implementa-
tion and the transitional measures planned for 1987 were not changed
in this process.
21
18. United Kingdom v. Council, 1988 E.C.R. 891.
19. Council Directive 88/146/EEC prohibiting the use in livestock farming of certain sub-
stances having a hormonal action, 31 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 70) 16 (1988).
20. According to Art. 10 of the newly adopted directive, the date of implementation by
Member States remained fixed at January 1, 1988, two-and-one-half months before the adoption
of the directive. To address this problem, the Council resolved at its March 7 meeting that the
directive should apply retroactively. EUROPE: DAILY BULLETIN, No. 4738, Mar. 7-8, 1988, at 8.
21. Apparently, Council Decision 87/561/EEC on transitional measures concerning the pro-
hibition of certain substances, 30 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 339) 70 (1987), was never amended,
although it was based on the nullified directive 85/649/EEC, supra note 13, and referred to it
frequently.
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C. Conflict with the United States
A second conflict became apparent within the context of United
States-EEC trade relations. The United States declared that it would
neither accept nor itself consider a ban on the use of hormones in
animal fodder.2 2 The issue of a ban was taken up in bilateral negotia-
tions between EEC and U.S. trade representatives.2 3 The matter's ur-
gency was augmented by the fact that the major American meat
producers had filed a claim with the government against the EEC re-
garding the ban, based on section 302 of the Trade Act of 1974.24 This
was an indication by the Americans that they desired to bring the dis-
pute before GATT. They contested the scientific foundation of the
hormone ban in the Community. If the discriminating nature of the
EEC requirements within GATT were substantiated, countermeasures
would be taken. 25 The EEC, however, persisted in asserting that its
measures were legitimate and legal. 26 In October 1987, the United
States formally applied to GATT for the creation of an investigative
committee and panel of experts. The EEC insisted on bilateral consul-
tations in advance. 27
Even before the directive of December 31, 1985, was "exchanged"
for that of March 7, 1988, the idea that more time was necessary for
negotiations had emerged. Within the Council of Ministers, postpon-
ing the implementation date for the directive became a controversial
part of the discussion. 28 However, due to difficulties in implementing
the directive (difficulties emerging out of the second expansion of the
Community in the South), the Commission suggested that additional
transitional measures should be enacted. 29
The Americans lent emphasis to their demands by deciding to in-
troduce sanctions if the hormone ban were put into effect. 30 This
surely was a substantial reason for the Council's decision of November
18, 1987,'3 1 to postpone the execution of the directive from December
31, 1987, to December 31, 1988. The difficulties of standardization
within the Community were cited. It was also asserted that there was
22. EUROPE: DAILY BULLETIN, No. 4555, May 22, 1987, at 15.
23. EUROPE: DAILY BULLETIN, No. 4587, July 10, 1987, at 10.
24. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1974); EUROPE: DAILY BULLETIN, No. 4591, July 16, 1987, at 8.
25. EUROPE: DAILY BULLETIN, No. 4596, July 24, 1987, at 9.
26. EUROPE: DAILY BULLETIN, No. 4624, Sept. 24, 1987, at 7.
27. EUROPE: DAILY BULLETIN, No. 4636, Oct. 10, 1987, at 8.
28. EUROPE: DAILY BULLETIN, No. 4643, Oct. 21, 1987, at 6.
29. Id. at 8.
30. EUROPE: DAILY BULLETIN, No. 4666, Nov. 25, 1987, at 7.
31. Council Decision 87/561/EEC on transitional measures concerning the prohibition of
certain substances, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 339) 70 (1987).
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no desire for an abrupt termination of the market for animals previ-
ously treated with hormones. However, the most likely primary objec-
tive was to win time for further negotiations with the United States.
Until the end of December 1988, negotiations were unsuccessful.
The United States insisted that the hormone ban be investigated by a
group of technical experts under the auspices of the GATT Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade, a treaty that had been negotiated in
the Tokyo Round.3 2 The EEC refused, maintaining its sovereign right
to judge for itself the extent of the health risk posed by hormone use.
As a compromise, the EEC offered to exempt animal fodder from the
ban on the sale of hormone-treated meat within the EEC. Further-
more, the EEC offered to raise import quotas for high-quality beef (so-
called "Hilton-beef"), quotas by which it approved a specific amount
of beef at an advantageous tariff rate. The United States was not satis-
fied, but conceded that given the specified limitations on the ban, the
United States would also reduce the retaliatory measures which had
been threatened.
33
On January 1, 1989, the hormone ban became effective within the
Community. In response, the United States implemented economic
sanctions in the form of retaliatory tariffs affecting $153.5 million in
products from the EEC.3 4 The EEC had threatened to apply tariffs of
equal worth to imports of American honey, walnuts, dried fruit, and
canned corn. However, in the background loomed a further threat by
the United States that could have resulted in a total ban on imports of
meat from the EEC. According to the stringent legal requirements of
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 35 the U.S. could
prohibit the importation of meat from States with lower inspection
standards than its own.3 6 It was the opinion of the American Con-
gress that this Act was applicable to the EEC and that the American
Government had the requisite authority to carry out the prohibition.
In response, the EEC Commission had ready as a counter-measure a
list of U.S. products, whose aggregate value totalled approximately
$361 million, that would be subject to restricted import levels.
At the same time, the EEC demonstrated that it did not necessarily
favor an escalating spiral of retaliatory trade measures. Even before
32. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 71) 29 (1980).
33. US.-EC Trade War Over Hormone Ban Likely After U.S. Rejects Proposed EC Compro-
mise, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 1554 (Nov. 30, 1988).
34. Producers of instant coffee and fruit juices were hit especially hard by this. Ironically,
the largest producer in this area is the Hag AG in Bremen, which is a subsidiary of General
Foods.
35. Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988).
36. The possibility is derived from § 4604, the reciprocal meat inspection requirement.
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Christmas 1988, meat for livestock fodder was withdrawn from the list
of banned products, and importation was permitted. The Community
also made clear that there would be no automatic retaliation or use of
counter-measures. Thus, the EEC signalled to Washington its willing-
ness to negotiate on trade issues.
The Council of Ministers agreed that no sanctions would be im-
posed by the Community, at least until the meeting of the GATT
Council in February, 1989. The EEC had also indicated that it would
consent to the convocation of a GATT panel for dispute settlement, as
provided in article XXIII. This awakened hopes which went unful-
filled in the GATT Council meeting of February 9, 1989. It became
apparent that GATT involvement in the dispute was not based on the
consensual agreement of both parties. The U.S. wanted only a techni-
cal experts group, while the EEC refused this option. The EEC de-
sired a dispute settlement panel to investigate whether the Americans
were justified in taking unilateral economic sanctions, without utiliz-
ing the settlement procedures of GATT article XXIII. 37 Despite this
failure to find a solution, bilateral negotiations resumed. In February,
a seventy-five day "ceasefire period" was agreed upon during negotia-
tions in Washington, while a combined group of experts searched for
plausible solutions. At issue was the question of whether hormone-
free meat could be furnished to the EEC in an economically satisfac-
tory manner. 3
8
The dispute's further development up to Fall 1989 exemplifies the
typical features of trade law disputes between States of similar eco-
nomic power. On one side, pragmatism was the prevailing theme. A
bilateral group of experts prepared for the gradual opening of the Eu-
ropean market to U.S. meat exporters that met EEC health require-
ments. As a result, EEC imports increased, leading to a
corresponding but limited reduction of U.S. punitive customs duties.39
The EEC complained that the reductions were insufficient. It
threatened to enact its own sanctions if the pragmatic solution failed
to bring about a speedier redress. 4°
Still, the Council remained unwilling to pursue unilateral sanc-
tions. In October 1989, the Council formally decided to request a
GATT dispute settlement procedure.41 Regarding the legal issues in-
37. EUROPE: DAILY BULLETIN, No. 4952, Feb. 10, 1989, at 6.
38. Suddeutsche Zeitung, Feb. 20, 1989, at 22.
39. EUROPE: DAILY BULLETIN, No. 5058, July 15, 1989, at 6; EUROPE: DAILY BULLETIN,
No. 5059, July 17-18, 1989, at 9; EUROPE: DAILY BULLETIN, No. 5085, Sept. 8, 1989, at 5.
40. EUROPE: DAILY BULLETIN, No. 5060, July 19, 1989, at 7; EUROPE: DAILY BULLETIN,
No. 5092, Sept. 18-19, 1989, at 9.
41. EUROPE: DAILY BULLETIN, No. 5104, Oct. 5, 1989, at 7.
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volved in the dispute, the views of the parties now diverge as much as
ever. It would be timely and appropriate for GATT to intervene at
this juncture to find a legal solution.
II. ECONOMIC IMPACT
The ban on imports of hormone-treated meats affected American
producers as well as meat-importing companies in the EEC which
maintain close business relations with the United States. The importa-
tion of slaughter by-products was of chief concern, as hormones are
rarely used in meat products of higher value, and the U.S. does not
export such higher-value products to the EEC in large quantities.
42
Also, in view of the threatened ban on imports, several European im-
porters had bought large quantities of meat in advance. On the U.S.
side, there were product surpluses. The loss of the European export
market resulted in increased U.S. supplies of meat, falling prices, and
loss of farm income.43 For these reasons there was a feverish search
for substitute markets, with particular attention paid to Mexico and
Japan.
Special interests within the United States did not take a uniform
position. In early 1989, cattle breeders from Texas expressed an inter-
est in supplying the EEC with hormone-free meat products. This offer
was made by John Hightower, the Secretary of Agriculture in Texas,
and aroused great interest within the Community." At this time,
Hightower also expressed the fear that competitors of American meat
producers in Argentina, Australia, Brazil and New Zealand would fill
the gaps resulting from the American refusal to comply with the EEC
ban on hormones. American consumer organizations were also de-
manding that U.S. production methods be brought into compliance
with EEC standards so that American consumers could be supplied
with hormone-free meat in the future.
In contrast to the United States, Argentina welcomed the EEC ban
on hormones. Argentina claimed to be the world's lowest user of hor-
mones for feeding purposes. As a result of the growing dispute be-
tween the EEC and the U.S., it expected a competitive advantage, 45 as
did other Latin American exporting countries. In Australia, the gov-
ernment of New South Wales recommended that its beef producers
conform their breeding practices to EEC requirements. Twenty per-
42. EUROPE: DAILY BULLETIN, No. 4693, Jan. 6, 1988, at 12.
43. Neu Abstazmarklefuir Hormonfleisch, Suddeutsche Zeitung, Jan. 5-6, 1989, at 29, col. 1.
44. EC to Talk Further with Texas Farm Officials about Offer to Export Hormone-Free U.S.
Meat, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 94 (Jan. 25, 1989).
45. EUROPE: DAILY BULLETIN, No. 4665, Nov. 23-24, 1987, at 8.
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cent of Australian beef was raised using methods that incorporated
hormones. The Australian producers themselves, however, refused to
accept the European ban.46
In the United States, the burden of the dispute was borne by im-
porters of products (like fruit juices and instant coffee) that were cov-
ered by the American sanctions. Trade sanctions, under the
circumstances, cut both ways. Here, a more general point emerges:
foreign States and their producers are not the only ones affected by
sanctions - importers of the banned goods in the State imposing the
sanctions are similarly affected. Due to import barriers and prohibi-
tions, goods become scarce in the home market. This leads to price
increases that are paid for by consumers. Trade sanctions imposed on
economic grounds, therefore, always have the added result of transfer-
ring income from consumers to producers in the protected economic
sectors - in this case, the agricultural sector.
Finally, the ban on hormones also affected those pharmaceutical
companies that produce hormonal substances used for feeding pur-
poses. They brought claims individually. Distrivet, a French hor-
mone producer, sued the Council of Ministers, claiming the invalidity
of the decision of 87/561/EEC.47 The President of the European
Court refused a motion for a temporary order in this case, citing the
obvious inadmissibility of the claim. 48 Distrivet later brought a fur-
ther claim of invalidity against the Council of Ministers, specifically
the directive 88/146/EEC. Distrivet made this claim together with
the American pharmaceutical concern Pitman-Moore and the "Euro-
pean Federation for Animal Health" (FEDESA), which was founded
by eight American companies, seven of which produce hormones.
This claim met with no better success. Again, the President of the
European Court refused the claim based on inadmissibility.49
III. PUBLIC HEALTH DIMENSIONS
The EEC's position is that the public health dangers posed by hor-
mone products have not yet been adequately determined. Until this
question is clarified, the EEC has taken upon itself the right to pro-
hibit the sale and importation of these products without discriminat-
ing between domestic and foreign breeders. There is, without
question, a lack of definite scientific data existing either to confirm or
46. EUROPE: DAILY BULLETIN, No. 4696, Jan. 9, 1988, at 10.
47. Distrivet v. Council, 1988 E.C.R. 209.
48. Id. at 214-16.
49. FEDESA v. Council, Case 160/88 (ECJ decision of July 13, 1988) (not yet published).
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disprove the dangers of these substances. This was admitted by Mar-
tin Bangemann, the German Economic Secretary at the time, who had
expressed a definite understanding of the American position.
As previously mentioned, scientific studies in the Community have
indicated a high likelihood that the three natural hormones do not
have deleterious effects on health. In contrast, the dangers posed by
the two synthetic hormones are still unclear. Of further importance
were the results of a group study conducted by the FAO and the
WHO in 1987. The study found natural hormones to be so unobjec-
tionable in terms of health risks that all threshold limits could be
abandoned. Minimum levels were only established for the two syn-
thetic hormones.50
The question remains to what extent adverse health effects must be
proven before a State may legitimately exclude a product from its mar-
kets. The EEC has applied a standard of broad discretion, referring to
similar United States policies long practiced in the fields of veterinary
medicine and food quality. In these areas, the United States unilater-
ally adopted extensive regulations, with which EEC exporters were
required to comply. The public health rationale behind these regula-
tions is now as questionable as ever. One example is the prohibition
on using unpasteurized milk to make cheese. It is a procedure used
without objection in Europe and, in the opinion of the EEC, poses no
public health threat. The same is true of the American ban on imports
of sprayed citrus fruits, apples, and flowers. The policy posing the
most difficulty for the Federal Republic. of Germany is the ban on im-
ports of beef and pork products. The American view is that German
agricultural concerns have not eliminated hoof and mouth disease or
trichinosis. It is a questionable rationale, since cows and pigs are inoc-
ulated against these diseases in Germany. Still, German meat prod-
ucts may only be imported into the United States when they originate
in certified, disease-free farms. In all of these cases, the United States
has unilaterally pursued its own public health interests.
IV. EVALUATION UNDER GATT
The GATT 5 is one of several mechanisms regulating trade be-
tween the United States and the EEC. Although the EEC is not itself
50. Die Zeit, Jan. 6, 1989, at 15.
51. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187; see generally J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW
OF GATT (1969); E. McGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION (1986); R. SENTI,
GATT SYSTEM DER WELTHANDELSORDNUNG (1986); K. W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1970); R.E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM
AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY (1975); H.J. MOLLER, GATT: RECHTSSYSTEM NACH DER
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a contracting party of GATT, through its assumption of legislative
powers on matters of foreign trade under the EEC Treaty, 52 it has
taken on the de facto position of a party, a status tacitly accepted by
the other contracting parties.5 3 Public health concerns are among the
regulated exceptions articulated in article XX of GATT. According
to this section, GATT never prohibits national policies that relate to
the protection of public health unless they are used in an arbitrary or
unjustifiably discriminatory manner, or if they present a disguised re-
striction on international trade. A State has only the burden of prov-
ing public health concerns as a valid exception to general GATT
obligations if other rights under GATT appear to be violated by these
policies.
Public health policies might arguably be governed by article III of
GATT. This article forbids protecting domestic production by using
discriminatory policies that burden imported goods.54 However, be-
cause our concern here is with an import ban on goods from countries
and companies not on EEC lists, the issue is actually one of trade bar-
riers. These are dealt with in article XI of GATT, which provides that
no import prohibitions or restrictions - whether made effective
through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures - shall
be instituted or maintained. This standard also applies to limitations
on imports motivated by public health concerns.55 Such health re-
strictions are not included in the exceptions to the general prohibition
that are contained in article XI, section 2.56
Thus, the EEC must rely on the general exceptions for public
health policies provided in article XX of GATT. Accordingly, the
regulation of the use of hormones in the meat of stock animals must be
TOKIO-RUNDE (1986); Petersmann, Dreissig Jahre Allgemeines Zoll- und Handelsabkommen, 19
ARCHIV DES VOLKERRECHTS 23 (1980).
52. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, opened for signature Mar. 25,
1957, art. 113, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
53. See, e.g., Ehlerman, Die innergemein schaftliche Anwendung der Regeln des GA TT in der
Praxis der EG, 20 EUROPARECHT 91-95 (1985) (EC practice when applying GATT rules within
the EC); Petersmann, Die EWG als GA TT-Mitglied-Rechtskonflikte zwischen GA TT-Recht und
Europaischem Gemeinschaftsrecht, 20 EUROPARECHT 78 (1985) (The EEC as a member of the
GATT; legal conflicts between GATT law and the EC). Cf. the landmark decision of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice, International Fruit Co. v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit, 1972
E.C.R. 1219.
54. The article requires national treatment of foreign goods. The hormone ban, applying
equally to foreign and domestic products, conforms with this duty.
55. It would be too narrow to limit article XI only to quotas on imports. See E. McGov-
ERN, supra note 51, at 186; see also CONTRACTING PARTIES TO GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS
AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS Supp. 25, at 68 (1979) (Panel Report on minimum import prices in
the EEC).
56. This is also true of the relatively generous agricultural product exceptions in section 2(c),
which pertain to market regulation.
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applied without discriminating by country of origin. The EEC ban
applies to all meat products, regardless of origin. Exceptions are made
according to the type of product, not the country of origin. The
American suggestion that the ban is a veiled limitation on trade can-
not be substantiated. The European regulation is not motivated by a
desire to protect hormone-free meat. This misconstrues the essence of
the ban, which was primarily conceived in response to protests from
consumer organizations. The fact remains that, in addition to the im-
pact of the ban on third-party States, the ban has also affected the
agricultural sectors of States within the EEC that use high amounts of
hormones.
According to the wording of article XX of GATT, the EEC may
itself decide whether the hormone ban is necessary to protect public
health. The Community must evaluate whether the estimated resul-
tant risk of using hormones (a risk that all presently known scientific
research on both artificial and natural hormone substances has been
unable to rule out) can be tolerated, or if a protective ban should be
issued. Article XX does not require such measures to meet any spe-
cific prerequisites, aside from mentioning the permissible preventative
goals, but does require non-discriminatory effects. 7 The States them-
selves have discretion to decide how to protect public health within
their borders, but they must refrain from any discriminatory practices.
Imports should not be the only products to receive equal treatment
within the EEC; the same rules should apply to Community products
as well.
At the same time, experience within the EEC, in particular, has
shown that formally non-discriminatory measures may in fact disable
imports in favor of domestic goods, and States may employ and pre-
serve them with exactly, or partially, that intent. 58 However, the ECJ
may not interpret articles XI and XX of GATT as broadly as it does
article 30 of the EEC Treaty. While the court itself monitors applica-
tion of the protective measures of the EEC Treaty under article 36,
57. See CONTRACTING PARTIES TO GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED Docu-
MENTS Supp. 30, at 107, 125 (1984) (Panel Report titled United States - Imports of Certain
Automotive Spring Assemblies).
58. The formal definition of discrimination, still used by the Commission in Directive 70/50/
CEE, 13 J.O. EUR. COMM. (No. L 13) 29 (1969), was abandoned with respect to article 30 of the
EEC Treaty, supra note 52, which forbids quantitative restrictions on imports following the deci-
sion of the ECJ in Dassonville. Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837. Since then,
determinations have depended on the factual restrictions on trade. Many decisions of the ECJ
have demonstrated that positive determinations may be reached despite formal policies of equal
treatment. See Rewe-zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung ftir Branntwein (Cassis de Di-
jon), 1979 E.C.R. 649 (alcoholic content for liquor); Commission v. Germany, 1987 E.C.R. 1262
(sausage imports).
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international bodies do not enjoy such extensive authority within the
context of GATT. GATT dispute settlement panels are not perma-
nent organs with full judicial independence. The final decision on dis-
putes is made by the contracting parties, the political plenary organ of
GATT. Thus, the preconditions for an independent organ like the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice to monitor and, if necessary, supersede State
decisions concerning preventive health measures do not yet exist
within the framework of the present GATT legal order.59
The protective clause of article XX leaves States the freedom to
decide the method, intensity and necessity for precautions, while say-
ing little regarding the effects of protective measures. According to
the standard, the EEC in this case has not exceeded the limits deter-
mined by the protective clause.
Even if the United States maintains a different opinion, it may not
unilaterally retaliate without violating its responsibilities to the EEC
under international law. This also holds true for punitive tariffs when
they are set higher than U.S. contractual tariff obligations accepted
during the tariff reduction rounds under the auspices of GATT, arti-
cle II. In addition, selective tariffs also violate the Most-Favored-Na-
tion ("MFN") principle of GATT, article I. Finally, GATT provides
for an arbitration procedure to resolve legal disputes. This procedure
must be used to attempt a reconciliation before resorting to any retali-
atory measures.
GATT, article XXIII provides that a contracting party may apply
for dispute settlement if it believes that the concessions or other advan-
tages it has gained as a result of this treaty have been nullified or im-
paired. 6° A violation of GATT is not required for the initiation of this
procedure, but, if such a violation can be shown, there is a rebuttable
presumption of injury. As a matter of course in such a proceeding, a
59. See supra note 55, and accompanying references.
60. The dispute settlement procedure under article XXIII of GATT was developed in a
"Framework Agreement" of the Tokyo Round. Understanding Regarding Notification, Consulta-
tion, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, in AGREEMENTS RELATING TO THE FRAMEWORK
FOR THE CONDUCT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 13 (GATT 1979). An annex contains an agreed
description of the procedures that have arisen out of customary law. See Meng, Streitbeilegung
im GATT, 41 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT
69 (1981); Petersmann, Strengthening GA TT Procedures for Settling Trade Disputes, 11 WORLD
EcON. 55 (1988); Hudec, GA TT Dispute Settlement after the Tokyo Round' An Unfinished Busi-
ness, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145 (1980); DeKieffer, GA TTDispute Settlement: A New Beginning
in International and US. Straight Law, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 317 (1980); Comment, The
GA TT Dispute Settlement Procedure in the 1980s. Where Do We Go from Here? 5 DICK. J. INT'L
L. 82 (1986); Note, Current Efficacy of the GA TT Dispute Settlement Process, 22 TEX. INT'L L.J.
87 (1987); Bercero, Trade Laws, GA TT and the Management of Trade Disputes between the US.
and the EEC, 5 Y.B. EUR. L. 149 (1985); Bliss, GA TT Dispute Settlement Reform in the Uruguay
Round' Problems and Prospects, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 31 (1987); Davey, Dispute Settlement in
GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51 (1987).
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panel will be created to report to the GATT Council. The Council
then decides whether to accept the panel's report and its recommenda-
tions regarding the dispute. As a last resort, the Council may also
authorize one of the parties to take retaliatory measures.
In cases of alleged GATT violations, States are not free to choose
between taking part in a dispute settlement proceeding and resorting
to self-help by initiating economic retaliatory measures. Article XX-
III of GATT provides that a party "can" utilize such procedures.
However, the carefully graduated procedural structure, allowing for
the eventual authorization of retaliation only as a last resort, has no
useful purpose if States that are economically powerful enough could
independently assume the right to implement repressive measures as
valid reprisals under international law. 6' In such a system, the
greater economic powers would dominate, leaving weaker States with
no means of economic redress. Only through internationalizing the
arbitration process and authorizing sanctions can GATT parties reach
some degree of bargaining equality.
Article XXIII begins to take on meaning only when one sees it as
obligating GATT States to utilize this method of dispute settlement,
rather than immediately threatening to initiate unilateral sanctions.
Doubts have arisen as to whether American practice under section 301
of the Trade Act conforms to this principle. Moreover, the U.S. Con-
gress has apparently rejected the principle of nonretaliation. 62 On the
other hand, however, State practice within GATT - where the pre-
dominant rule of interpretation is based on considerations of effective-
ness - supports the principle. 63 Thus, American retaliatory measures
in the hormone dispute were illegal under GATT - even without con-
sidering the further question of whether a State, under general interna-
tional law, may eventually resort to reprisals if a contracting party
blocks dispute settlement proceedings under GATT article XXIII.
The latter is a subsidiary issue that may be considered in light of gen-
eral principles of international law concerning repressive acts. The
United States, however, never requested an article XXIII proceeding.
61. Partsch, Reprisals, in 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 330-35 (R.
Bernhardt ed. 1986).
62. See House Ways and Means Committee Hearings on the Trade Reform Act of 1973,
H.R. REP. No. 571, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 66-67 (1973).
63. See also CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED
DOCUMENTS Supp. No. 23, at 98 (1977) (Panel Report on DISC Legislation). In a dispute
between the U.S. and Brazil, more than thirty Contracting Parties demanded that the U.S. utilize
the dispute resolution procedures of GATT before imposing sanctions, since unilateral sanctions
would be destructive to the GATT system. Included among these states, in particular, were the
EEC and Japan. See U.S. Rebuffs Criticism at Council Meeting that It Acts Unilaterally on Trade
Problems, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 194 (Feb. 15, 1989).
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Its request for a technical experts group was not based on the article
XXIII dispute settlement procedure.
In contrast, faced with the prospect of U.S. retaliation, the EEC
did ask for an article XXIII proceeding. Despite the EEC request, an
important obstacle remained since such proceedings cannot be con-
ducted in the face of a U.S. objection/refusal to participate. Legally,
both parties to a dispute have the right to a voice in all decisive phases
of the directive procedure, including the creation of a panel, passing
on the results of its investigation, and providing recommendations and
authorizations to the disputing parties. GATT, article XXV, para. 4
provides for majority rule as the norm for voting among the con-
tracting parties (which compose the primary organ) and thus, also, for
the Council. However, based on longstanding practice, these organs
have voted by consensus rather than by majority. 64 As demonstrated
by the GATT ministerial declaration of 1982,65 the idea that the dis-
senting vote of the accused party could block the entire procedure is a
possibility that is neither excluded nor made mandatory. In this con-
text, it is important to mention that in the vast majority of arbitration
procedures, consensus on determinations has been reached.
If the violating party can actually prevent the GATT dispute set-
tlement procedure from reaching its proper result (a result that may
include the authorization of sanctions), significant consequences result
for our evaluation of article XXIII procedure. If proceedings under
article XXIII are considered to be final and exclusive, then, arguably,
one can resort to the retaliatory rules of general international law only
where retaliation represents the sole adequate remedy against a party
that tries to escape the reach of article XXIII. However, one cannot
presume that recourse to reprisals would be forbidden where one dis-
puting party torpedoes the designated procedure of the article XXIII
dispute settlement process and where the other parties adhere to the
principle of consensus despite that party's recalcitrance. 66 It would be
senseless, absent an equivalent treaty procedure, for States simply to
give up their coercive rights under general international law.
A State's obstruction of the progress of article XXIII dispute set-
64. Petersmann, supra note 60, at 74. In the context of the Uruguay Round, the principle of
"consensus minus two" should be implemented. This principle would prevent the disputing par-
ties from participating in the decision.
65. CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCU-
MENTS Supp. No. 29, at 9 (1983) (Ministerial Declaration). The Declaration discusses continu-
ing use of the traditional consensus method in dispute settlement procedures. The Declararion
argues that this method should not lead to obstruction. It hints, in theory, that such an obstruc-
tion could lead to a retreat to the majority principle. In practice, such a retreat has not occurred.
66. See supra note 55, and accompanying cases.
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tlement proceedings leads to new interpretive questions. However, if
the United States continues to withhold its consent to the proper insti-
tution of article XXIII settlement procedures, and lack of consensus
among the Parties prevents a majority decision from being made, then
these circumstances should adequately fulfill the conditions for per-
mitting reprisals. Only when such an impasse is reached should it be-
come permissible for the EEC, confronted by the failure of
contemporaneous negotiations, to initiate economic sanctions in re-
sponse to those adopted by the United States.
V. COMPATIBILITY WITH THE AGREEMENT ON TECHNICAL
BARRIERS TO TRADE
Neither article III nor article XI of GATT provides satisfactory
protection against the erection of technical trade barriers. Therefore,
efforts have been made to develop more detailed regulations in this
area. In 1979, in the context of the Tokyo Round, the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade (Standards Code) [hereinafter "the Agree-
ment"] was created.67 It concerns all goods, including industrial and
agricultural products (article 1.3), and is thus applicable to meat prod-
ucts. Technical regulations were included in the Agreement. The reg-
ulations were defined in the treaty as binding prescriptions for
technical specifications, 68 which included determinations of quality
levels, limitations on use, and requirements regarding safety and mea-
surements. 69 One can infer from the reference to the urgent problem
of protection of public health in article 2.6 that health concerns were
incorporated into the "quality levels" and usage limitations of the
Agreement.
Article 2.1 of the Agreement prohibits technical regulations from
being developed or used with an intent to limit trade, or from uninten-
tionally resulting in "unnecessary barriers to international trade." Ar-
ticle 2.1 also forbids discrimination between imported and domestic
goods. The Agreement contains further obligations regarding consul-
tation and publication of technical regulations (articles 2.5 and 2.6).
Third World producers are normally allowed a generous period to
conform to new regulations (article 2.8).
Apparently, the EEC has not violated any formal obligation. The
67. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 71) 29 (1980).
Here, the EEC is a full treaty party. For information concerning the Agreement, see Nus-
baumer, The Gatt Standards Code in Operation, 18 J. WORLD TRADE L. 542 (1984), and Middle-
ton, The GATT Standards Code, 14 J. WORLD TRADE L. 201 (1980).
68. See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, supra note 67, at Annex 1.
69. Id. at Annex 1.
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question is whether the hormone ban has violated the substantive obli-
gations of article 2.1 of the Agreement. Discriminating against im-
ports from third states, as well as against other EEC goods, is
prohibited by the rules described above. The essence of these rules
and the resulting burdens within the Community also exclude the as-
sumption that trade barriers have been erected by the EEC under the
pretext of public health precautions. The fact that meat produced in
other States under locally acceptable conditions may not be imported
into the EEC is undoubtedly a trade barrier. However, the question
remains whether the ban has the effect of creating an "unnecessary
trade barrier."
Once again, the question becomes how large a margin of tolerance
should be allowed for the policy position of each individual State.
There is no precedent to consult. Surely, one should not demand that
States, in spite of well-founded suspicions, must tolerate the presence
of potentially harmful substances in domestic and imported foodstuffs,
absent conclusive proof of deleterious health effects. On the contrary,
States should have broad discretion to make such decisions. This
point is emphasized in article 2.2 of the Agreement on Technical Bar-
riers to Trade, which permits a State, for health protection reasons, to
deviate from international norms that are judged unfit. The State's
decision must, of course, be substantiated upon request.
In contrast, EEC practice has shown that public health measures
have been used in the past as a pretext for protectionism. For this
reason, there are limitations on misuse beyond which treaty obliga-
tions will be considered violated. The above-mentioned explanatory
requirement indicates that States have the responsibility to substanti-
ate their actions - a necessity for minimizing abuse of discretion. To
this extent, the obligations under the Agreement go beyond GATT
obligations. Whether these obligations are violated by the EEC hor-
mone ban, at least with respect to natural hormones, depends on medi-
cal and biological assessments.
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade creates a procedure
for multistage negotiations so that a nonpartisan decision can be made
to determine the limits beyond which abuse will exist. 70 As GATT,
article XXIII similarly envisions, a determination may be made not
only as to violations of law, but also as to situations in which parties
have lost or suffered impairment of a benefit flowing from the treaty.
Initially, there is a consultation requirement. The problem is brought
before the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, a plenary organ
70. Id. art. 14.
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of the Member States. The Committee first determines whether the
dispute concerns trade issues or technical questions that would require
more careful, technically-informed examination (article 14.5). In the
latter case, a group of technical experts may be formed at the request
of one of the parties. This is not an option, like that specified in
GATT, article XXIII, to be chosen at the discretion of the Committee,
but instead is mandatory. The requirement is counterbalanced by the
fact that decisions in the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade
are made only by consensus. One party alone can thus veto the forma-
tion of a technical group, as the EEC did in the case of the hormone
ban.
71
Alternatively, upon the request of a disputing party the Committee
can and must create a special panel to investigate the matter, facilitate
arbitration, and give an advisory opinion to the Committee. The
Committee then makes a final decision. It can, in the case of a suffi-
ciently serious charge, authorize the injured State to suspend its obli-
gations under the Agreement (article 14.21). These procedural steps
also face the threat of obstruction by one of the disputing parties, due
to consensus practice.
The U.S. request for the formation of an expert group was blocked
by the EEC. However, the U.S. did not request a dispute settlement
procedure as provided by the Agreement. Only this procedure is per-
mitted to lead to the authorization of retaliatory measures. Such
measures could only be applied within the framework of the Agree-
ment, where article 14.21 refers to the suspension of obligations
"under this Agreement." This means that injured States may not
erect technical trade barriers without being limited by considerations
of necessity. In the hormone incident, however, the United States did
indeed implement punitive tariffs. As long as these tariffs remain a
unilateral act by a state, they represent, in principle, a violation of
article II of GATT. The violation arises because such retaliation goes
beyond the scope of the Agreement. Thus, in the context of the dis-
pute settlement procedure of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade, the position of the United States is illegal.
It remains to be examined whether the United States may respond
to an asserted violation of the Treaty on Technical Trade Barriers with
unilateral retaliatory action in the form of a violation of article II of
71. Another question is whether the creation of such an investigative group can be halted.
Article 13.3 of the Agreement specifies that international organizations that play dual functions
(the mixed FAO/WHO Commission on the Codex Alimentarius is an example) should be
avoided. Id. art. 13.3. As mentioned, the FAO/WHO plenum had just investigated the impact
of hormones. However, such an investigation would not bind GATT in any legal respect.
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GATT. Under general international law there would be no hesitation
in permitting a country to respond to the violation of one treaty by
violating another, if the counter-violation were directed toward the
same treaty partner 72 and if other preconditions of retaliation had
been met. This practice can, however, be prohibited through special
treaty provisions. Neither GATT nor the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade permits the enactment of counter-measures without
the authorization of the responsible organ, barring a demonstration
that proper procedure has been obstructed. In both cases, the rule
applies only to counter-measures directed at actions which are covered
under the same treaty, within the same "frame of reference." It would
not, however, make much sense if counter-measures in the context of
another treaty relationship could be freely taken. The intent to exert
international control over retaliatory measures by requiring authoriza-
tion would be defeated. For these reasons, one must treat the corre-
sponding regulations as completely prohibiting "cross-counter-
measures," such as responding to a violation of the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade with a violation of GATT provisions.
This conclusion is also supported by article 14.23 of the Agreement,
which attempts to reconcile the arbitration procedures of the Agree-
ment and those of article XXIII: those of the Agreement take prece-
dence, while the GATT procedure applies only to disputes arising out
of GATT itself. Both procedures theoretically comprise a harmonized
unity, a circumstance incompatible with the unilateral retaliation pre-
viously described.
In conclusion, many perspectives lend support to the EEC posi-
tion. In any case, since no settlement procedure is underway, the U.S.
sanctions are at present illegal. In spite of this, they will not fail to
have an effect. An economically rational solution will likely be found
in order to avoid the harms of further retaliatory measures. Such a
solution, however, would be a result of economic pressures, not a vic-
tory for the rule of law. It is regrettable that in recent times threats to
impose sanctions have often preceded the initiation of legal proce-
dures. The fact that threats are normally followed by escalation of the
dispute speaks for the economic rationale, but not for the pre-emi-
nence of law in the field of international economic relations. One can
only hope that the major trading nations will realize that substantive
as well as procedural legal instruments are available to them within
the context of GATT. These instruments will help make implementa-
72. In the case of a multilateral treaty, the counter-violation must not be precluded by the
rights of other treaty partners.
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tion of the law a top priority in international trade - a condition for
ensuring the legal rights of all trading nations.
